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An analysis of the e￿ects of natural hazards on society does not solely
depend on a region’s topographic or climatic exposure to natural processes,
but the region’s institutional resilience to natural processes that ultimately
determines whether natural processes result in a natural hazard or not. An
appropriate method for an international institutional comparison in the ￿eld
of natural hazard management is still missing. The focus in this paper is on
the institutional comparison of societal risk transfer mechanisms mitigating
the e￿ects disasters. Dynamic panel estimates using growth data from a)
199 European regions (NUTSII) between 1990-2004 and b) 3.050 U.S. coun-
ties between 1970-2003 reveal a signi￿cant negative impact of historical ￿ood
events on regional economic development. The application of GIS-data on
the spatial distribution of ￿ood events further allows to control for a regions
exposure to ￿oods. In the short run, a major ￿ood event in a European region
reduces the regional GDP by 0.4%-0.6%; an average ￿ood event in the U.S.A
reduces the personal income by 0.3%-0.4%. Mandatory insurance regimes in
Europe absorb the negative short-run e￿ect of a ￿ood, while the National
Flood Insurance Program in the U.S.A. mitigate the e￿ects of a ￿ood by
about 50%. The results provide empirical foundation for the proposition
that ex ante risk transfer policies are more e￿cient than ex post disaster
relief.
Keywords: Natural Hazards, Growth, Insurance, Dynamic Panel GMM
JEL classi￿cation: G22, Q54, R111 Introduction
In the ongoing discussions on the e￿ects of climate change on society numer-
ous studies estimated the "economic" impact of changing climatic conditions.
One result of anthropogenic climate change could be an increase in the fre-
quency of extreme weather events (IPCC 2001). So far, large natural catas-
trophes are like shocks to society and the economy, but more frequent events
could mean that at least in some regions of the world natural catastrophes
may become "normality" rather than rare shocks. In order to develop e￿-
cient adopation strategies a detailed analysis of the impact of natural hazards
on society is needed. The analysis in this paper starts with a basic question:
"How do Natural Hazards a￿ect society?" If a river runs over the bank or
an avalanche runs down a hill it is not a natural disaster per se it is just a
natural process. The natural process becomes a "natural hazard" as soon as
human beings, infrastructure or other forms of tangible or intangible capital
is threatened and/or destroyed. Whether this natural process does not a￿ect
individuals at all or "evolves" to a natural disaster is not solely in the realm of
the natural environmental, but crucially depends on the behaviour of human
beings living in this environment. Human (economic) activity in general and
thus human behaviour in coping with natural processes is determined by the
institutional framework they act in and the resulting incentives. Therefore,
an analysis of the e￿ects of natural hazards on society does not solely depend
on a region’s topographic or climatic exposure to natural processes, but the
region’s "societal exposure" to natural processes that ultimately determines
whether natural processes result in a natural hazard or not. In addition,
the institutional setting de￿nes the channels through which natural hazards
a￿ect society. Hence, the primary purpose is to show that institutions do
matter in natural hazard management and implement this thought both in
a theoretical and empirical manner. In particular the e￿ects of ￿ood events
on regional economic development using GVA-data from 18 European coun-
tries - the EU-15 (excl. Ireland) Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland
and Switzerland (an ultimate number of 199 NUTSII-regions) and 3,050 U.S.
counties will be estimated by using dynamic panel methods. In comparison
1to a damage function, regional income is a more comprehensive indicator
that encompasses both direct (decrease in the stock of human and phys-
ical capital) and indirect (e.g. decrease in production and consumption)
e￿ects. Risk-transfer-mechanisms have an in￿uence on both e￿ects. The di-
rect e￿ects could be lowered by ex-ante incentive that induces risk-reducing
behaviour (e.g. risk-based insurance premiums increase the costs of housing
in hazard-prone areas and thus decreasing the concentration of wealth in
these areas). After a disaster occured, victims su￿er from a loss of wealth
and income. For example after the 2005 ￿ooding in alpine areas in Europe,
victims in the canton fo Graubuenden, Switzerland (a country with manda-
tory insurance) obtained the full replacement value for their losses within
4-7 days. Flood victims in the bordering regions of Tirol and Vorarlberg
in Austria (a country with governmental disaster assistance) had to wait on
average for 51 days until they an average ￿nancial relief of 50% of the dam-
age. Delayed an insu￿cient compensation for damages reduces the level of
consumption and could have far reaching e￿ects for the regional economy.
Therefore an institutional analysis of societal risk-transfer-mechanisms de-
mands an indicator that grasps all e￿ects of ￿ooding on society’s well-fare.
The hypothesis that ex-ante risk transfer policies are more e￿cient than ex-
post disaster relief(Kunreuther & Pauly 2006) has not been rigorously tested
so far. This study enlarges existing empirical work on the impact of ￿ood
events on economic development and quanti￿es the e￿ects of di￿erent risk-
transfer mechanisms.
2 E￿ects of Natural Hazards on Economic De-
velopment
Following natural disasters governmental sources and media publish esti-
mates on the "economic losses" society has su￿ered. In general disasters
a￿ect economic stocks (direct e￿ects) as well as economic ￿ows (indirect ef-
fects). Damage on a company’s production facilities is a decline in capital
stock. The following business interruption leads to a reduction of output
2and service ￿ows. Although the majority of loss reports focus on direct
losses to stocks, ￿ows tend to be a preferable measure for damage estimates
(Rose 2004). First, ￿ows give a wider picture of the e￿ects of natural dis-
asters. Machines in a factory may not be directly struck by a ￿ood but
production can still decrease or pause production because of shortages in in-
termediate goods, energy or natural ressources due to the disaster. Second,
losses to stocks might exaggerate damages due to natural disasters as only a
fraction of the asset value translates into actual services and thus increases
utility at a given point in time. Third, ￿ows incorporate indirect e￿ects of
natural disasters in a more comprehensive manner. Rose (2004) identi￿es
three comprehensive approaches to estimate economic losses due to natural
disasters: Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGE), Input-Output
Models (I-O) and econometric analysis.
Computable general equilibrium models (CGE) can simualte individ-
ual optimization behaviour in the context of e.g. business interruptions or
ressource shortages resulting from natural disasters. Rose & Liao (2005) ap-
plied this technique to estimate the regional economic impacts of disruptions
in the water services of the Portland (Oregon, US) metropolitan area. The
simulation yiels in overall (direct and indirect) losses in output from water
outage between 30,5% (with pre-event mitigation) and 41% (without any
pre-eventmitigation) within the ￿rst week after an earthquake of magnitude
6.1 took place. This implicates between $418 mill. and $561 mill. of losses to
the gross output of the Portland metropolitan area within this period. It is
important to note, that these studies only measure a small fraction of actual
e￿ects of disasters on the economy and focussing on macroeconomic vari-
ables can thus deliver a broader picture. Au￿ret (2003) developed a simple
framework to perform such an assesment on the aggregate level.
The immediate e￿ects of a natural disaster is a reduction of the amount of
human and physical capital. Natural catastrophes can have direct e￿ects on a
nation’s mortality rate (e.g. Anbarci, Escaleras & Register 2005, Kahn 2005)
or increase outward migration ￿ows to other countries (Halliday 2006). The
pioneering work by Albala-Bertrand (1993) tried to estimate the direct cap-
ital losses through natural disasters. This direct destruction of input fac-
3tors is followed by disruptions in production and output. The cross-country
analysis by Tavares (2004) shows that natural disasters have a small, but
negative e￿ect on economic growth. Several studies concentrating on the
macro-economic impacts of natural disasters on developing countries provide
similar results. Rasmussen (2004) presents a comprehensive study of natural
disasters in the Eastern Caribean Currency Union. He concludes that disas-
ter damages in this area amount to about 0.5 % of GDP. The panel study
by Au￿ret (2003) also ￿nds a decline in output due to natural disasters in
Latin American and Caribbean economies.
The possible decline in national output in the aftermath of a disaster
can lead to an increase in imports and a decrease in exports resulting in a
deterioration in the balance of trade(Au￿ret 2003). The panel-econometric
study by Gassebner, Keck & Teh (2006), however shows a general negative
impact on trade (0.3% in imports and 0.1% in exports). The assumed e￿ect
of a deterioration in the balance of trade only applies for small exporting
countries.
Another macro-economic e￿ect of disasters is related to the level of in-
vestment. The impact on national investment levels is ambigous. It mainly
depends on the reconstruction e￿ort and the e￿ciency of the risk-transfer
regime in place. Private investment tends to decrease while governments
tend to initiate more public spending. This might than lead to a higher
budget de￿cit. The reduction in output and investment can also lead to a
decrease in private consumtion. The study by Au￿ret (2003) ￿nds that nat-
ural disasters have a rather large negative impact on investment growth, as
well as a negative e￿ect on public and private consumption. Regarding inter-
national investment ￿ows, Yang (2005) shows that following a major disaster,
the national level of foreign lending, inward foreign direct investment as well
as migrant’s remittances increase.
After experiencing natural disaster individuals might accumulate a "bu￿er-
stock" of capital as a form of self-insurance against future losses. Based on
an intergenerational model, Skidmore (2001) showed that this form of risk-
transfer might lead to an ine￿cient increase in aggregate savings. His cross-
section analysis in 15 OECD countries showed that the number of natural
4disasters between 1965-1995 had a signi￿cant positive impact on the amount
of aggregate net household savings.
In the medium to lung run, natural disasters can also have a positive
e￿ect on economic development, by boosting the economy’s technolgoy en-
dowment. A recent study by Crespo-Cuaresmo, Hlouskove & Obersteiner
(2007) shows that a nation’s exposure to catastrophic risk has a positive ef-
fect on knowledge spill-overs from foreign technology transfers. Skidmore &
Toya (2002) ￿nd in a cross-country analysis that higher frequencies of cli-
matic disasters are correlated with increases in total factor productivity and
economic growth because disasters provide the impetus to update the capital
stock and adopt new technologies in the medium to long run.
Existing empirical work analysing the growth e￿ects of natural hazards
show several de￿cits: From a methodological point of view one problem oc-
curs by using cross-section data. Islam (1995) points out the drawbacks of
cross-section analysis of economic growth. He argues that single cross-section
regression ingore the country-speci￿c aspects of the aggregate production
function resultin in an omitted variable bias. His analysis shows "[...] that
persistent di￿erences in technology level and institutions are a signifcant fac-
tor in understanding cross-country economic growth." (Islam (1995) p.1128).
As already suggested, country-speci￿c institutional factors might be crucial
in determining the e￿ects of natural hazards on economic growth. Therefore
existing studies might have obtained biased results. Islam (1995) provides
a panel-econometric extension of the standard cross-section growth model
developed by Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992). The empirical analysis in the
present paper takes its theoretical origin from these extensions.
A further point of critique stems from the spatial dimension of the exist-
ing studies. Both Tavares (2004) and Skidmore & Toya (2002) analyse the
e￿ects of natural disasters on country level using data from the EM-DAT
database. Although, there is no doubt that large catastrophes such as Kath-
rina in 2005 or the Tsunami in South-East-Asia in 2004 have large impacts on
a nation’s economy, other disaster events and "smaller", that are included in
the EM-DAT database, might be "cushioned" by the institutional forces and
a nation’s aggregate economy. An analysis on regional level could therefore
5account for the spatial distribution of disaster e￿ects. This might allow to
identify the societal channels that determine the e￿ects of hazards on eco-
nomic growth in a more detailed manner. Existing empirical work was not
able to identify certain characterisitcs regarding a country’s exposure to nat-
ural hazards. This is simply due to the fact, that such data was not availlable
so far. However, a recent project by the World Bank in collaboration with the
Columbia University (Dilley, Chen, Deichmann, Lerner-Lam, Arnold, Agwe,
Buys, Kjekstad, Lyon & Yetman 2005) identi￿ed global disaster hotspots.
The underlying GIS-data is used to calculate a region’s exposure to natural
hazards. By creating an interaction term that accounts for this hazard ex-
posure one can control whether a ￿ood occured in an already hazard-prone
area or a region with actual low level of occurence probability.
3 Institutional aspects of societal risk-transfer
and Natural Hazards
Keeping in mind, that anthropogenic climate change could possibly increase
the frequency of extreme weather events, the e￿cient allocation of ressources
in natural hazard management is essential to sustain a certain level of eco-
nomic welfare. This allocation is incrementally in￿uenced by the institutional
framework de￿ning the actors’ incentives within the societal decision-making-
process. Therefore the institional design of natural hazard management and
its e￿ect on the relationship between natural disasters and economic devel-
opment will be analysed. A comparison of alternative instituional designs in
natural hazard management allows to examine the stengths and weaknesses
of di￿erent systems and identify more e￿cienct insititutions. In this paper
the focus clearly lies on the institutional design of societal risk-transfer and
natural hazards.
So far a wide range of theoretical and empirical literature already showed
the positive e￿ects of di￿erent institutions on economic development in gen-
eral. The empirical work by Kahn (2005) shows that a number of broad
institutional variables can have mitigating e￿ects. He empirically assesses
6the impact of economic development and institutional quality on the death
toll from natural catastrophes. In a ￿rst step he analyses the e￿ects of GDP,
a countries land area and geographic location on the probability that a dis-
aster occurs. The probit estimates show that in general these variables do
not have a signi￿cant e￿ect on disaster probabilities 1. Then he showed that
the GDP per capita has a negative impact on both a nation’s total death toll
from natural catastrophes and a nation’s death toll from earthquakes, ex-
treme temperature, ￿oods, landslides and windstorms seperated. In a third
step he evaluated the impact of instituions on the disaster death toll. He
used a nation’s level of democracy, income inequality, ethnic fragmentation
and good governance indicators as proxies for institutional quality. Coun-
tries with better institutions, lower income inequality and a lower level of
democracy expereince more deaths. He argues that this might be explained
that these nations do not properly enforce zoning laws and building codes,
however calls for more research in this area. Anbarci et al. (2005) analyse
the e￿ects of a country’s inequaltiy (using the Gini coe￿cient) on earthquake
fatalities. Their results suggest that a nation’s inequality - as a proxy for the
nation’s institutional quality and ability to adopt preventive measures and
policies (e.g. the creation and enforcement of building codes)- increases the
number of earthquake fatalities (controlling for the earthquakes intensity).
3.1 Institutional design of risk-transfer
In this paper, the focus lies on more speci￿c institutional variables that reduce
the societal e￿ects of natural disasters, namely risk-transfer-mechanisms.
The market for insurance against ￿ooding works imperfectly or fails com-
pletely. Adverse selection and moral hazard can only partly explain these
market imperfections Ja￿ee & Russell (2003). Kunreuther (2000) de￿ned
the sitution of distorted demand and insu￿cient supply on the market for
natural hazard insurance as the disaster syndrome. Individuals tend to un-
derinsure because of a) the underestimatation of risk of low-probability high
1GDP per capita only has a signi￿cant negative e￿ect on the probability of a ￿ood
disaster
7loss events and b) the expected ￿nancial relief by the government or private
charity. This market failure has led to di￿erent forms of government inter-
vention in the market for disaster insurance. In Europe several countries
(France, Great Britain, Spain and Switzerland) have installed a system of
mandatory insurance, where every house-owner and company is obliged to
purchase insurance coverage against natural-disaster-risks (for an overview of
the di￿erent forms in each country see Von Ungern-Sternberg (2004)). The
U.S. government has implemented the National Flood Insurance Program
in 1968 in order to provide insurance cover against ￿ooding at subsidized
premiums. In participating counties, houseowners in hazard-prone areas are
obliged to purchase insurance coverage against ￿oods. To other houseowners
￿ood insurance is available at reduced premiums. Depending on the extent
of coverage, such an instiutionalized insurance system should absorb some of
the e￿ects of a ￿ooding on the economy.
In regions without institutionalized insurance regimes, risk-transfer against
natural hazards is in the realm of the individuals and politicians. According
to Skidmore (2001) individuals try to protect themselves against potential
disaster damages by building up a capital bu￿er. This for of self-protectiong
is rather ine￿cient as the bu￿er stock is very often bigger than the actual
losses. However, if self-insurance does not cover the disaster losses govern-
ments provide catastrophe assistance and ￿nancial relief. Governmental relief
is either organized through a fund (e.g. Austria) or politicians provide ad-hoc
￿nancial assistance to the victims (e. g. Germany). Governmental disaster
assistance can lead to the problem of charity hazard, the phenomenom that
people underinsure or do not insure at all due to anticipated governmen-
tal assistance and/or private charity (Raschky & Weck-Hannemann (2006)
Schwarze & Wagner (2004)). In addition to an ine￿cient amount of insur-
ance coverage, ￿nancial assistance from the government does rarely meet the
needs of the disaster victims and leads to an ine￿cient allocation of public
funds. An econometric study by Garrett & Sobel (2003) shows that almost
half fo FEMA’s disaster payments are politically motivated. They show
that disaster expenditure is signi￿cantly higher in election years (around $
140 million as compared to non-election years) and that states with higher
8political impact haver on average a higher rate of disaster declaration (a req-
uisite for ￿nancial assistance). Besley & Burgess (2002) ￿nd similar results
using panel date from India on governmemental food programs after crop
￿ood damage. The work by Mustafa (2003) concluded that after the 2001
in Pakistan public support cheques where mainly distributed among family
members and political supporters of local councilors coordinating the gov-
ernmental assistance. Insu￿cient public relief and allocative ine￿ciencies
should thus reduce the absorbing e￿ect of governmental assistance. In com-
parison to an institutionalized ex-ante risk-transfer system, the mitigating
e￿ect of governmental disaster assistance should be smaller.
3.2 Disasters and mitigating institutions in an endoge-
nous growth model
Albala-Bertrand (1993) provides a theoretical framework for the analyses
of direct e￿ects from disaster losses on the economy. His model de￿nes an
upper and lower bound for output fall from direct capital loss through natural
disasters. The decrease in the economic growth rate is de￿ned by the loss-to-
output ratio. He also applied his theoretical model to estimate the economic
losses from six major disasters events in Latin America. GDP of four out
of six countries increased within the year the disaster occured and the two
following years. However, he did not use any further econometric methods to
test his hypothesis. Ikefuji & Horii (2006) incorporated natural hazard risk
into an endgenous growth model, where the frequency of natural disasters is
linked to the amount of pollution. Natural hazards have an increasing e￿ect
on the depreciation rates of physical as well as human capital, although they
assume that the damage on human capital is relatively lower compared to
the damage on phyiscal capital.
The analysis starts with a basic Solow model as used by Mankiw et al.
(1992) and applies the assumptions made by Tol & Leek (1999) regarding
investments in disaster management. In particular, the focus lies on the
institutional design of the risk-transfer-mechanism as a mean of mitigating
9the e￿ects of disasters on the economy. Assume the following Cobb-Douglas
production function for production at time t
Y (t) = K (t)
α [A(t)L(t)]
1−α , (1)
where 0 < α < 1
According to the Solow-model it is assumed that L and A grow exoge-





Hence, the number of e￿ecive labour A(t)L(t), grows at a rate (n + g).
Taking s as the constant rate of saving and investment, k the stock of capital
per e￿ective unit of labour, K/AL, y as the level of output per e￿ective unit
of labour, Y/AL, and δ the constant rate of depreciation, the dynamics of k
are given by
˙ k = syt − (n + g + δ)kt − D(Ft,φt)kt (4)
= sk
α
t − (n + g + δ)kt − D(Ft,φt)kt. (5)
Dt represents the damage from hazard risks at time t, which is a function
of Ft, a variable accounting for the magnitude of the disaster and φt, 0 ≤
φ ≤ 1, representing the fraction of losses covered by insurance..
D(Ft,φt) =

         
         
Dt = 0 if Ft = 0,φt = 0
0 < Dt ≤ 1 if Ft = 1,φt = 0
0 < Dt ≤ 1 if Ft = 0,φt = φ∗
Dt = 0 if Ft = 1,φt = φ∗
0 < Dt < 1 if Ft = 0,0 < φt < φ∗
0 < Dt < 1 if Ft = 1,0 < φt < φ∗
10Under the assumption of actuarially fair pricing, the amount of losses paid
in disaster periods and the amount of insurance premiums paid during non-
disaster periods depends on the level of insurance coverage φ. φ∗ represents
full coverage resulting in Dt = 0 if Ft > 0 and φt = φ∗. Risk management
activity with insurance creates opportunity costs in the form of insurance
premiums lowering consumption and investment, Dt > 0 if Ft = 0 and
0 < φt < φ∗.








Substituting equation 6 in the production function and taking the loga-
rithm leads to the steady state income per capita:
ln(y
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Mankiw et al. (1992) now assume that the rate of technological progress
is the same for all countries and in a cross-section regression t is a ￿xed
number. Therefore, they suggest that
ln(A0) = α + , (8)
where α is a constant and  is a country-speci￿c ￿xed term.
This cross-sectional framework assumes that TFP ( A) is homogenous
across all countries and regions. However, several studies show that this does
not apply. If TFP di￿ers between regions and correlates with other variables,
the estimates from the cross-section model are biased (Islam 1995). Islam
(1995) proposed the following a panel-data framework that includes regional
dummies as a control variable for di￿erent levels of technology.





∗) − ln(yt)). (9)
Where λ = (1 − α)(n + g + δ). Equation 9 leads to the log-linear adjust-
ment process towards the steady-state.





∗) − ln(yt−1)] (10)
Substituting y∗ using equation 7 gives the following growth equation:































Adding ln(yt−1) to both sides of the equation results in an alternative





























4 Natural Hazards and Economic Growth - Em-
pirical Evidence
4.1 Data
The macro-data for Europe was kindly provided by the European Regional
Database from Cambridge Econometrics. Data for U.S. counties stems from
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis as well as
12U.S. Census Bureau. For the ￿ood hazards we use data on ￿ood-disasters
that took place in the territorial unit and spatial information on the ￿ood-
exposure of the region, based on GIS-data. The data on ￿ood events are
taken from the most comprehensive data set on disasters, the EM-DAT by
the Centre for Research on the Epidemology of Disasters (CRED) in Brus-
sels. EM-DAT has collected around 12,000 reports of di￿erent disasters, such
as ￿ood, storms, earthquakes, volcanic erruptions, landslides as well as man-
made disasters. The disaster has to ful￿ll at least one of the following criteria
in order to be included in the database: 10 or more people reported killed, 100
people reported a￿ected, declaration of a state of emergency, call for interna-
tional assistance. Therefore, ￿oods that occured in thinly populated areas at
the time are not included in the database and in the analysis. Based on this
database, dummy-variables were created accounting for reported ￿ood events
in region j at time t. Normally, the dummy variable takes on the value 1
for the year (and region) in which the ￿ood incident took place. Accounting
for a ￿ood event by using a dummy could be seen as a simpli￿cation of the
problem (in particular by natural scientists). However there are three major
reasons for this simpli￿cation: 1) From a methodological perspective this
paper aims at estimating the e￿ects of an average ￿ood event on regional
income. With respect to forecasting the e￿ects of future ￿ood events - in
particular regarding a possible increase of such events due to climate change
- the e￿ects of an average historical ￿ood might be more valuble than the
e￿ects of one speci￿c historical ￿ood (e.g. the "100-years ￿ood in central
Europe in 2002"). 2) The damage to human or physical capital is an endoge-
nous variable (see section 3) and is therefore not an apporpriate measure for
a ￿oods severity. For example, in his analysis of the extent of hurricane dam-
ages on international investment ￿ows Yang (2005) used meteorological data
on hurricanes as an instrument for hurricane damage, due to the potential
endogenity of disaster losses. However, in comparison to hurricanes it is hard
to ￿nd variables for the extent of ￿ood damage that are clearly exogenous.
There are 111 ￿oods within the 199 European regions. 166 in the sample
have all 26 years. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (16 regions) have
1316 years the former GDR-regions (6) have 15 years 2. Figure 1 represents the
number of ￿oods per year that occured in the sample within the NUTSII-
regions.
- FIGURE 1 about here -
Flood data on historical events in the U.S. is obtained from the Sheldus
￿ood database kindly provided by the Hazards and & Vulnerability Research
Institute (2007). This database includes all ￿ood events on county level
between 1969 and 1995 that created more than U$ 50,000 in property or
crop damage. From 1995 on it has also included events that created less
than US$ 50,000 damage. Figures 2 and 7 show the number of ￿oods per
year in U.S. counties, Alaska and Hawaii.
- FIGURE 2 about here -
- FIGURE 7 about here -
Another issue concerning the ￿ood dummy is related to the within-year
occurence of the ￿ood. As the data on GDP and personal income is normally
calculated at the end of the year, one can assume that the e￿ects of ￿oods
that occured early in a year might have been absorbed at end of the year.
The problem in accounting for the month of the ￿ood’s occurence is that it
might lead to discretionarily setting the boundaries (e.g. First quarter or
￿rst half of the year) without any theoretical background. The number of
￿oods are more or less equally distributed over the year both for Europe (see
Figure 3) and the U.S.A (see Figure 4)
GIS-data on ￿ood hazard areas is based on a study by the World Bank and
Columbia University (Dilley et al. 2005) that identi￿es global natural disaster
hotspots. Data on ￿ood disasters from 1985 to 2003 has been collected and
georeferenced by the Dartmouth Flood Obsrevatory. These spatial historical
data on ￿ood events have then been combined in 1 ◦×1◦ grid cells (see Figure
1 for Europe and Figure 2 for the U.S.). The attributes of the grid cells
2Portugal Alentejo only has 2 periods, Portugal South has 24 years, Netherlands
Flevoland has 20 years
14range form 0 to 10, depending on the amount of georeferenced ￿ood events
in the grid cell. The GIS-data has certain limitations: 1) Flood extent data
identi￿es regions a￿ected by ￿oods and not the exact ￿ooded areas. 2) Data
on events in the early nineties are missing or of low spatial quality. However,
this GIS-data is the best (publicly) availlable data on ￿ood hazard area at
such an aggregated level that has been collected and processed with a uniform
method.
The data on ￿ood exposure is only cross-section and can thus not be
applied in the panel estimates. However, we use the GIS-data to construct
an interaction term that accounts for ￿ood-events in high, medium and low
risk regions. An additional vector-￿le identi￿es the territorial boundaries of
the NUTS II regions in Europe. The exposure to ￿ood hazards in region j,
hj, is now obtained by combining the raster-data from the "Natural Disaster
Hotspot" with the vector-layer and calculating the mean-value of the GIS







Table 1 summarizes the results for mean ￿ood exposure on nation-level.
Luxembourg turns out to be the nation with the highest ￿ood-exposure. The
mean ￿ood exposure of the European countries surveyed is 2.050.
- TABLE 1 about here -
The graphical representation of the regional ￿ood exposure can be found
in ￿gures 5, 6 and 8.
- FIGURE 5 about here -
- FIGURE 6 about here -
- FIGURE 8 about here -
The data on mandatory insurance regimes in Europe is taken from Von
Ungern-Sternberg (2004) and a treatment group is build. Great Britain is
15excluded from the mandatory insurance treatment group as it only shows
an insurance density of about 62% 3. In addition Portugal is included into
the group due to a penetration of natural hazardinsurance of about 90
% (Schweizerische Rueckversicherungs-Gesellschaft 1998) that comes close
to the extent of a mandatory insurance system. Regarding risk-transfer-
mechanisms in the U.S.A. the e￿ects of the NFIP are examined. Counties are
free to join the NFIP. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
has issued a Community Status Book that indicates whether a county is par-
ticipating in the NFIP Federal Disaster Management Agency (2007). The
focus is on analysing the e￿ects of the sole participation of a county in the
Program. However, the Community Status Book as well as the institutional
variations within the U.S. allows an in-depth examination of di￿erent pro-
gram types and policies4. An additional examination focusses on the political
economy of federal disaster assistance. Schwarze & Wagner (2004) argued
that the massive ￿nancial assistance after the 2002 ￿ooding in Germany aug-
mented chancellor Schroeder’s chances of re-election. An empirical study by
Garrett & Sobel (2003) showed that almost two thirds of FEMA’s disaster
assistance is politically motivated and that the extent of disaster assistance
is strongly correlated to presidential elections. Politicians can abuse these
ad-hoc rubber-boots-policies5 to gain votes in upcoming elections. Therefore
federal election years in Europe and congressional and presidential election
years in the U.S.A. are used as proxies for potential rubber-boots-policies.
3For an explanation see Von Ungern-Sternberg (2004)
4This is already part of the author’s ongoing research activity.
5After natural catastrophes, politicians very often enter the disaster areas, wearing
rubber boots, and promising immediate and unbureaucratic ￿nancial assistance to the
victims.
165 Empirics
From equation 12 and the theoretical assumptions in section 3 the following
speci￿cation for the econometric analysis can be derived:
ln(yit) = γtln(yi,t−1) + β1ln(sit)





ln(Ai)for regional ￿xed e￿ects and ηt as time
speci￿c e￿ects. Agricultit is the fraction of the primary sector in region i’s
economy at time t, Floodit is a dummy that switches to 1 if a ￿ood event took
place in region i at time t and Fit ∗ Insit is an interaction term representing
wether the ￿ood took place in a region with mandatory insurance (Europe) or
a county that is a member of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
(U.S.A.). For the U.S. personal income per capita is used (investment data
is not availlable on county-level).
Equation 14 shows the presence of a lagged dependent variable lnyit−1
among the regressors, that is not strictly exogenous. In addition, the sample
features a relatively large number of N (212 regions in Europe, 3,085 counties
in the U.S.) in comparison to a relatively small number of T ( on average 23
years in Europe, years in the U.S.). This constellation demands the applica-
tion of the dynamic panel data models. The analysis follows the suggestions
made by ?. Their Monte-Carlo simulation reveal that the one-step GMM
estimator proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991) performs well for unbalanced
panels with T = 20 and that the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (Anderson &
Hsiao 1981) outperforms other estimators if T = 30. Therefore we apply the
one-step GMM estimator for the unbalanced European sample ( T = 24 for
most of the regions, mean = 22.8) and the Anderson-Hsiao estimator for the
balanced U.S. sample (T = 35).
The set of instruments used in this speci￿cation follows the study on re-
gional convergence in Europe by Badinger, Mueller & Tondel (2004). Equa-
tion 6 states that the disaster funtion D actually a￿ects the steady state
capital stock and thus yit−1 in equation 12. Therefore lagged values of the
17￿ood variable Floodi,t−n and lagged values of the interaction term (Flood ∗
Insurance)i,t−1 are used as additional instruments for the lagged dependent
variable yi,t−1. The assumption that the ￿rst di￿erences of the instruments
are uncorrelated with the region speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects might not hold for the
growth model and this speci￿cation. Therefore the system GMM estima-
tor (?, ?) cannot be used and equation 14 is estimated using the one-step
di￿erence GMM.
5.1 Preliminary Empirical Results
The results for Europe and the U.S.A. cannot be compared directly, as the
samples di￿er in their ￿ood variables as well as the risk-transfer varialbes.
In addition, the Bureau of economic analysis has adjusted the income on
county level for several major disasters (Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
2006)6. We have accounted for this adjustment by simply including a dummy
(Corryear) that switches to 1 for the years an adjustment took place.
Therefore the reader should compare similarities in the signs of the co-
e￿cients rather the absolute size of the coe￿cients. Table 2 (Europe) and
table 3 (U.S.A) summarize the results of the Arellano Bond dynamic panel-
regression of the basic estimation, where the e￿ects of a ￿ood on regional
economic growth are estimated. If a ￿ood occured within the same year it
has the expected negative e￿ect on regional GDP in Europe (column 2.1)
and county level personal income in the U.S. (column 3.1). The coe￿cient
of the ￿ood-dummy for the European estimates is larger than the coe￿cient
for the U.S. This can be explained that the Sheldus database, the source for
the U.S. ￿ood-dummy, records nearly all ￿ood events while the EM-DAT-
database (Europe) only ￿les major ￿ood events. The sign of the lagged
￿ood-dummy (column 2.2 for Europe and column 3.2 for the U.S.) is almost
0 for Europe and positive and signi￿cant for the U.S. estimates. Combining
6The adjustments relevant for this analysis are Hurricans Andrew and Iniki in 1992,
the Midwest ￿ood and the East Coast storms in 1993, Hurricane Opal 1995, Hurricane
Floyd in 1999, Tropical storm Allison in 2001 and the Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan
and Jeanne in 2004.
18the ￿ood-dummy with the GIS-data on the regional ￿ood exposure leads to
a smaller coe￿cient in both samples (columns 2.3 and 3.3).
- TABLE 2 about here -
- TABLE 3 about here -
The next step consisted of the inclusion of institutional variables. As
already mentioned, it is not solely the natural process of ￿ooding, but the
process in combination with the institutional settings that might result in a
disaster. The interaction-term accounting for a ￿ooding in a region endowed
with mandatory insurance absorbs the entire negative e￿ect of the disaster
dummy(column 2.4). In the U.S. sample the interaction term for a ￿ood
in a county participating in the NFIP mitigates the e￿ect by about 50%.
Estimating the e￿ects of risk-transfer mechanisms in the following year the
results show a di￿erent picture. In Europe as well as in the U.S. the risk-
transfer regimes have a signi￿cant negative e￿ect on regional income and the
e￿ect is even bigger than the positive e￿ect of the lagged ￿ood-variable. This
means a negative net-e￿ect of risk transfer mechanisms in the following year.
- TABLE 4 about here -
- TABLE 5 about here -
The estimates regarding the e￿ects of election years and the assumed
bigger generosity of politicians seem to support the theory. Floods that
took place in years with federal elections have twice the negative impact
on regional GDP in Europe than ￿oodings in other years. In the following
year the e￿ect of the interaction term is about -0.9%, while the coe￿cient
for the lagged ￿ood variable is 0.4%. Thus, the positive e￿ect of a ￿ood in
the follow-up year is completly diminished through ine￿ciencies created by
governmental assistance. For ￿oodings in election years in the U.S.A. apply
similar results. The e￿ects of ￿oodings in years with congressional elections
do not clearly di￿er from those in other years. Presidential elections only
slightly mitigate the disasterimpact within the same year and decrease the
positive e￿ect in the following year.
196 Concluding Remarks
Natural disasters a￿ect society in various ways. The purpose of this pa-
per was to develop a theoretical an empirical framework for an institutional
comparison of risk-transfer-mechanisms. This was implied by estimating the
e￿ects of ￿ood events on regional economic growth both in Europe and the
U.S.A. The results suggest, that ￿ood events do have a negative impact
on regional GDP in European NUTSII-regions and personal income in U.S.
counties within the disaster-year and a positive e￿ect in the preceding year.
Additionally the impact of instituional resilience was brought forward. Re-
gions that have implemented mandatory insurance regimes (Europe) or take
part in the National Flood Insurance Program (U.S.A) are clearly better o￿
than regions without such a mechanism. Floodings that occured during elec-
tion years (as an empirical proxy for governmental relief) have an even larger
negative impact on regional economic development.
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26Figure 3: Frequency of Floods per month in Europe







































































29Figure 7: No. of ￿oods per annum in counties in Alaska and Hawaii









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 4. The e￿ects of ￿oods and federal elections on regional GDP in
Europe (NUTSII) - GMM-DIFF estimates
Dependent Variable 4.1a 4.2b 4.3b
Coe￿cient Coe￿cient Coe￿cient
lnyit (t-value) (t-value) (t-value)
lnyi,t−1 0.438*** 0.463*** 0.439***
(9.14) (11.80) (9.28)
lnsit 0.182*** 0.156*** 0.178***
(6.42) (7.79) (6.39)
Agricultureit −0.097*** −0.090*** −0.096***
(−5.71) (−6.51) (−5.72)






(Flood ∗ Election)it −0.004
(−1.09)






Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 4,277 4,277 4,277
Number of Instruments 194 263 260
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan 0.208 0.901 0.841
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.244 0.204 0.243
Marginal e￿ect of M.E. M.E. M.E.
￿ood disasters (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.)
In years without federal −0.004* −0.003 0.004**
elections (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
In years with federal −0.007** −0.009***
elections (0.003) (0.003)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ***, **, * indicate
signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. One-step GMM di￿erence
estimators based on Arellano & Bond (1991).
aThe third until the sixth lag of the lagged dependent variable
(yi,t−3 - yi,t−6) and the ￿rst until the ￿fth lag of the ￿ood variable
(Floodi,t−1 - Floodi,t−5)were used as instruments for the lagged
dependent variable yi,t−1.
bThe third until the sixth lag of the lagged dependent variable
(yi,t−3 - yi,t−6), the ￿rst until the ￿fth lag of the
￿ood variable (Floodi,t−1 - Floodi,t−5), the ￿rst and second lag of
the interaction term ￿ood variable and election year ( (Flood∗
Election)i,t−1, (Flood ∗ Election)i,t−2)) and the ￿rst and second lag
of the election year ((Election)i,t − 1, (Election)i,t−2,)were used as
instruments for the lagged dependent variable yi,t−1.
Source: Regional database Cambridge Econometrics, EM-DAT Centre
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Estimating the effects of risk transfer mechanisms against floods in Europe and 
U.S.A.: A dynamic panel approach 
 
Abstract 
An analysis of the effects of natural hazards on society does not solely depend on a 
region's topographic or climatic exposure to natural processes, but the region's 
institutional resilience to natural processes that ultimately determines whether natural 
processes result in a natural hazard or not. An appropriate method for an 
international institutional comparison in the field of natural hazard management is still 
missing. The focus in this paper is on the institutional comparison of societal risk 
transfer mechanisms mitigating the effects disasters. Dynamic panel estimates using 
growth data from a) 199 European regions (NUTSII) between 1990-2004  and b) 
3.050 U.S. counties between 1970-2003 reveal a significant negative impact of 
historical flood events on regional economic development. The application of GIS-
data on the spatial distribution of flood events further allows to control for a regions 
exposure to floods. In the short run, a major flood event in a European region 
reduces the regional GDP by 0.4%-0.6%; an average flood event in the U.S.A 
reduces the personal income by 0.3%-0.4%. Mandatory insurance regimes in Europe 
absorb the negative short-run effect of a flood, while the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) in the U.S.A. mitigate the effects of a flood by about 50%. The 
results provide empirical foundation for the proposition that ex ante risk transfer 
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